



## **BRAIN-TRAINS**

## Belgian research action through interdisciplinary networks – tranversal assessment of intermodal new strategies

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  - Project context and research goal
- Part 1: SWOT analysis
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- Part 2: Scenario development
  - Methodology
  - Results







• European Commission White Paper 2011:

Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system

- Goal:
  - 30% of road transport over 300 km towards rail and inland waterways by 2030 (50% by 2050)
  - In a context of growing transport demand
  - With a 60% emission reduction target



#### Introduction – Project context and research goal



- Effect of possible rail freight transport developments
- Operational framework with indicators

Findings

• Define strategies to create success story







- SWOT development: Delphi-technique
- SWOT Survey: Frequency tables, Modus & Hindex





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## 1. SWOT analysis – Results

• **STRENGTHS** 

- Larger capacities and higher payload of containers
  - Economies of scale
- Reduced costs and externalities (over long distances)

Direct emissions (CO2 in g/tkm) Source: Ecoinvent (2014) Rail IWW Road 0 10 20 30 40 50

- Liberalization of the market
  - In Belgium started since 2007
  - 2017: 12 licensed operators
- Relation between GDP and rail freight / intermodal transport
  - Mutual relationship
  - Decoupling



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**WEAKNESSES** 

- Weak network access and lack of flexibility
  - Long life-cycle of equipment & infrastructure
  - Priority of passenger traffic
  - Time necessary to book a slot
  - Low network accessibility
- High investments & high operating costs
  - Collection, distribution, hauling and transhipment
- Complex pricing strategies
  - Difficult to compare alternative options
- Missing (capacity) links
  - Will be resolved ?





#### 1. SWOT analysis – Results

## • **OPPORTUNITIES**

- Consolidation of flows
  - Economies of scale
- A Single European Market / Transport Area
  - European freight corridors
  - One-stop-shop
- Future road taxes
  - Decreasing road attractiveness
- Standardization and interoperability
  - Increased flexibility and service level





**THREATS** 

Savings

#### 1. SWOT analysis – Results

Cancellation or delay infrastructure projects

Impossibility to consolidate / Low interoperability

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- Priority regulation
  European monopoly / duopoly
  - A good or a bad thing ?

Slow modernization

Limited cooperation

Passenger traffic interference



## 2. Scenario development - Methodology



Findings



Limited number of parameters – Three scenarios (Best/Medium/Worst)

- Explorative, plausible future developments, consistent

Forecasting, predictions

Time horizon: 2030

















#### **3. Findings**









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## **Optimal corridor and hub development**

#### **Objectives:**

**3a**:

- To simulate the optimal setup of national and international intermodal rail freight corridors.
- To give cost modeling insights to achieve more educated decisions in the future scenarios.

#### Methods:

- Operations Research.
- Numerical optimization.

#### Points of focus from the SWOT analysis:

- Reduced costs and externalities
- High operating costs.
- Complex pricing strategies.

Weaknesses Hind Barres May Office belspo

**Strengths** 



#### **3a: Best case: Main conclusions**

- Order of economic preference/affordance: road, IWWs then rail
   -> high rail fixed costs.
- Positive effect of *road costs, IWWs costs* and *road taxes* parameters in the best case. However, overall application yields a more costly position.
- A directly proportional relation exists between the intermodal market share and the corresponding competition's trucking price and market size.



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- Positive effect of rail subsidies in the first stages; stagnation reached if continued, particularly in the best case.
- The competitiveness of intermodal transport is sensitive to the paths' structure; namely, the distance limits imposed on the road parts -> pre- and post-haulage.





#### **3a: Worst case: Main conclusions**

 Worst-case scenario: intermodal market share decreases for economic and environmental optimizations

#### The followed policy influences the modal split:

- Economic optimization: road transport
- Environmental optimizations: intermodal rail transport
- Different modal transfers from the reference to the worst-case scenario:
  - Economic optimization: between road and intermodal transport
  - Environmental optimizations: within intermodal transport



Introduction



#### **3a: Worst case: Main conclusions**

#### Road taxes

- Decrease of road market share but not as high as environmental optimizations
- Lower effect on road market share in the worst-case than in the reference scenario
- Takeaways
  - Influence of the policy on modal split
  - Expected increase of the road market share if the objectives of the White Paper are not taken into account
  - Necessary to adapt the tax instrument to the economic conditions under study





## **3b: Macro-economic impact: Introduction**

- Why an economic analysis?
  - Freight transport
  - > Direct
  - Economic value



#### Rest of the economy

Indirect

Strategic significance

- Objective
  - Quantify direct & indirect economic impact
  - Analyse company & sectoral level
  - Development of economic indicators based on added value and employment parameters





## **3b: Macro-economic impact: Direct economic impact**

#### • Results







Part 1

Introduction



## **3b: Macro-economic impact: Direct economic impact (2)**

#### • Results

Economic indicators (incumbent operator) – Added value range





Part 1 Introduction



## **3b: Macro-economic impact: Indirect economic impact**

- Results:
  - Input
- Strong link with other land transport, transport supporting activities & business administration
- Output
- Strong link with other land transport, transport supporting activities & metal industry
- Leontief approximation
  - Rail freight transport multiplier = 2.985
  - Other sectors: average  $\Delta$  from original = 0.02





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## **3c: Life Cycle Assessment (LCA)**

• Environmental impacts of a product from raw material extraction, through materials use, and finally to disposal





## **3c: Life Cycle Assessment (2)**







Intermodal electric rail freight transport represents an opportunity to attain a more environmentally and energy-efficient transport system

Impact category	Difference of environmental impact compared to lorry 24-40 t Euro VI		
	Electric train	Diesel train	
Climate change	-29%	-9%	
Ozone depletion	-36%	-27%	
Human Toxicity, non-cancer effects	-1%	+2%	
Human Toxicity, cancer effects	+43%	+43%	
Particulate matter	-48%	-17%	
Ionizing radiation HH	+79%	-6%	
Ionizing radiation E (interim)	+43%	-18%	
Photochemical ozone formation	-34%	+42%	
Acidification	-26%	+37%	
Terrestrial eutrophication	-20%	+60%	
Freshwater eutrophication	+35%	+20%	
Freshwater ecotoxicity	-53%	-52%	
Land use	-75%	-65%	
Resource depletion	-43%	-40%	



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## **3d: Government organisation: Current levels of policy organisation**

- Autonomous decision-making between political actors from different levels of government regarding the transposal of the EU ITS-directive.

- Minimal policy coherence between federal and regional levels of government to comply to the set targets of the EU-level.

- Up till now, there has only been very limited collaborative effort to establish a comprehensive and uniform policy strategy that transcends the different levels of government



Introduction

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## **3d: Government organisation:** Who should take the lead?

#### • At the political-level?

- A Federal Minister?
- A regional Minister? From Wallonia, Brussels Capital Region or Flanders?
- A neutral facilitator?
- At the administrative level?
  - An intergovernmental coordination network?
  - An expert group? A follow-up committee?
  - Separate administrative leaders for each level of government?



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## **3d: Government organisation:** Which actors should be involved?

- Only the political core?
  - Solely Ministers of Mobility, or also of Ministers of (affected) departments (e.g. economy, finance, environment)?
- An administrative network?
  - How many departments and agencies? And when is a department/agency relevant or 'affected enough' to join the collaboration?
- Stakeholders?
  - How to select 'the right' stakeholders?



Part 2

Introduction



# **3d: Government organisation: Outlook?**

How 'long-term should the policy strategy be? An outlook to 2020? 2030? 2050? 2100?

- And how to deal with long-term policy strategies when there are new elections?
- How detailed must the policy strategy be?
  - Only output parameters?
  - Abstract future outlooks?
  - Detailed, and non-reversible, policy strategies.



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Part

Introduction











#### Market scope: Western European market







## **3b: Regulation: Methodology**





Findings

## **3b: Regulation: Results: static approach**



Source: own composition





#### **3b: Regulation: Results: static approach (2)**

tion							Tight Oligopoly >
С П	Rank	Company	Turnover (€)	Nationality	Creation		Loose oligopoly 25 –
Introdu	1	DB Schenker Rail	4.517.000.000	DE	1994	7	60%
	2	Rail Cargo	2.073.100.000	AU	1923	56% of the	No oligopoly <
	3	SNCF Geodis	1.107.000.000	FR	1937	market	25%
	4	PKP cargo	999.767.000	PL	1918		
	5	SBB Cargo	821.240.009	СН	1902		
	6	Geneese&Wyoming	635.928.658	USA	1995		
ヒ	7	Trenitalia cargo	623.000.000	IT	1905		
Pa	8	B logistics	451.860.473	BE	1926		
	9	Green cargo	444.266.000	SE	1856	(	
	10	Нирас	392.400.000	СН	1967		Low concentration
	11	Europorte	267.000.000	FR	2005		< 1000
$\sim$	12	RENFE mercancias	259.800.000	ES	1941		Moderate concentration 1000 –
بَ ب	13	CTL Logistics GmbH	177.634.046	PL	2003		High concentration
Jar	14	CFL Cargo	153.793.792	LU	1946		> 1800
ш.	15	Cargo Net	147.255.689	NO	1883	HHI = 1266 →	Monopoly
	16	Lotos Kolej	141.359.734	PL	2002		10 000
indings	17	BLS Cargo	138.978.758	СН	1941		
	18	Verkehrsbetriebe Peine - Salzgitter	115.651.000	DE	1971		
	19	LKAB Malmtrafik	112.571.000	SE	1903		
	20	Holding Exploris	94.000.000	LU	2014		





## **3b: Regulation: Results: dynamic approach**













#### **3b: Regulation: The Netherlands**

duction		
ŏ	LEVER	MAIN FACTS
Intr	General facts	<ul> <li>Rail freight modal share: 3% (2000) – 5% (2013)</li> <li>Rail freight traffic (ton-kms): 4,5 billion – 6.1 billion (2013)</li> </ul>
Part 2 Part 1	Performance contract	<ul> <li>Every 10 years, current contract: 2015-2025 with yearly monitoring and deep evaluation of indicators and objectives at mid-term (2019).</li> <li>11 indicators with quantitative objectives and penalties, including 2 for freight (user satisfaction and punctuality).</li> </ul>
	Transport policy	<ul> <li>National strategy for rail freight (2014)</li> <li>Main objectives: reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and operating costs to increase market attractiveness.</li> <li>Rail policy supported by a financial fund of €2.4 billion (migration towards ERTMS, STS program to improve the daily resilience, the high-frequency program to increase the traffic, a third track towards Germany from the Betuwe route in 2022).</li> </ul>
	Network statement	<ul> <li>Two types of modulation for rail freight:</li> <li>Price for access charges more attractive on the Betuwe route than the classic network (-24%);</li> <li>Advantage for access charges above 600 tons.</li> </ul>
	Regulatory body	<ul> <li>Not specialized in rail</li> <li>No restrictive control on the network statement</li> </ul>

Findings

The Netherlands

Freight strategy for Rotterdam





## **3b: Regulation:** Austria

uction						
pc	LEVER	MAIN FACTS				
Intro	General facts	<ul> <li>Rail freight modal share: 27% (2000) – 36% (2013)</li> <li>Rail freight traffic (ton-kms): 16,6 billion – 19,3 billion (2013)</li> </ul>				
2 Part 1	Performance contract	<ul> <li>Every 5 years, current contract: 2016-2021 with yearly monitoring.</li> <li>Indicators to control the implementation of the transport policy (progress of works, congestion, punctuality).</li> <li>Incentive scheme: financial penalties in case of non-achievement.</li> </ul>				
	Transport policy	<ul> <li>National transport strategy (freight and passengers) between 2012 and 2025</li> <li>Objectives for freight: + 42% in ton-kms for freight by 2025 and + 30% of capacity on the network.</li> <li>Actions: Yearly investment of €2 billion, reduction of bottlenecks, infrastructure modernization (ERTMS).</li> <li>Other: policy of subsidies for the rail freight market (single wagon, non-accompanied vehicle and rolling roads, ERTMS)</li> </ul>				
	Network statement	<ul> <li>Special penalties for freight upper 60 minutes of delay.</li> <li>Special discount for locomotives equipped with ERTMS on the equipped lines.</li> </ul>				
Par	Regulatory body	<ul> <li>Observatory of competition:</li> <li>Analysis of the economic conditions.</li> <li>Analysis of traffic and market share of new operators (per company).</li> </ul>				
-indings	Aust	<ul> <li>Analysis of partnerships and mergers between national companies and foreigners.</li> <li>Annual survey to know the market about network access, business factors, transport policy, technical standards,)</li> <li>Policy for competition on the market (strong monitoring)</li> </ul>				





## **3b: Regulation: Switzerland**

uction		
od	LEVER	MAIN FACTS
Intr	General facts	<ul> <li>Rail freight modal share: 52% (2000) – 47% (2013)</li> <li>Rail freight traffic (ton-kms): 11.1 billion – 11.8 billion (2013)</li> </ul>
	Performance	Every 3 years, current contract: 2017-2020 with yearly monitoring.
t 1	contract	Main indicators: Safety (number of collisions), availability of the infrastructure (number of slot cancelled), Productivity, etc.
ar		National program to develop the rail infrastructure by 2030 (PRODES): +70% of freight traffics
	Transport	Massive infrastructure investments since 1986 (Rail 2000)
	policy	Taxes for road since 2001 (RPLP) according to the distance and the CO <sub>2</sub> emissions;
		Investment to reduce noise from rolling stock.
		Plan for migration towards ERTMS.
7		Evaluation every three months of pricing for access charges according to the market and costs.
art	Network	Pricing modulation (incentives) for:
Ъ.	statement	- Locomotives with a good environmental performance.
		- Locomotives equipped with ERTMS.
		- Rolling stock equipped to reduce the noise.
8S	Regulatory	Independent Commission (CACF) to control the non-discrimination on the network mainly for pricing and access.
	body	Part of the Federal Office for Transport (OFT) which assumes the biggest part of the economic regulation
-indin	Sv	Long term policy for rail & performance
		belsno LiÈGE 200}

belspo



## **3b: Regulation:** Belgium

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ן ר	LEVER	MAIN FACTS
Ξ∥	Conoral facto	Rail freight modal share: 11%– 14% (2013)
dit T	General lacts	Rail freight traffic (ton-kms): 7,7 billion (2000) – 6.5 billion (2013)
	Performance contract	Every 4 years, last period: 2008 – 2012
		Objective for freight: +35% tons-km between 2006-2012
		One indicator with incentive for passenger (max number of minutes for delay)
		No indicator with incentive for freight
- 1	Transport policy	Port connectivity: Antwerp & Zeebruges
- 1		Safety and interoperability: full migration towards ERTMS in 2025
rdrt z		Modernization of the network: reduction from 350 traffic centers in 2005 to 31 in 2017
	Network statement	No advantage to the rail freight for access charges
	Regulatory body	No restrictive control on network statement
		Limited control on the rail freight market because of the large share of international
		traffic

Belgium

Findings

Doubts about organization (holding/unbundling) Unclear strategy & monitoring for rail





